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ABSTRACT
The orthodox view of market definition in antitrust cases is that the
same principles of market definition should apply at all stages of an
antitrust analysis, and, in particular, that markets should be defined
for virtually all purposes by reference to demand-side substitutability.
Commentators have struggled to reconcile the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Ohio v. American Express Co.—in which the majority com-
bined services to cardholders and services to merchants into a single
antitrust market, despite the evident lack of substitutability between
them—with that familiar view.
In this short Article, we suggest that this effort at reconciliation
may be unnecessary, and perhaps even undesirable. Against the ortho-
dox view, we claim that market definition should be “disaggregated”
such that the correct approach to market definition may vary depend-
ing on the element of the antitrust analysis for which it is being used.
Thus, while market definition based on substitutability is an appealing
tool for the assessment of market power, it may not be appropriate for
the evaluation of competitive effects in all cases under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The majority opinion in AmEx can (and perhaps should)
be understood as an implicit—albeit cryptic—endorsement of a disag-
gregated approach to market definition.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ohio v. American Ex-
press Co. (AmEx) has sparked a surge of interest in the antitrust anal-
ysis of multisided platforms.1 The case concerned agreements between
American Express and merchants that accept American Express
cards, prohibiting those merchants from “steering” customers away
from American Express cards.2 The Court’s decision evaluated the
claims of a set of government plaintiffs that such “antisteering” provi-
sions violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The distinguishing (if, arguably, not quite unique3) feature of the
decision lies in the fact that the American Express credit card network
is a “multisided platform.” The two sides of the American Express
platform serve, respectively, the cardholders and merchants partici-
pating in the network. While lower courts have previously grappled
with antitrust analysis in the context of platforms,4 AmEx represents
the Supreme Court’s first modern foray into this space, triggering an
outpouring of scholarly literature5 as well as considerable attention in
the popular press.6
1. Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (AmEx), 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
2. See infra Part II.
3. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (discussing
violation of the Sherman Act by newspaper company that refused to publish ad-
vertisements for companies that were also advertising on a local radio station).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
5. See, e.g., Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2019);
Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, Multisided Platforms and Antitrust Enforce-
ment, 127 YALE L.J. 2142 (2018); Oscar Borgogno & Giuseppe Colangelo, Anti-
trust Analysis of Two-Sided Platforms After AmEx: A Transatlantic View
(Stanford-Vienna Transatlantic Tech. Law Forum, Working Paper No. 41, 2019);
see also Andrew I. Gavil & Jordan L. Ludwig, The Many Sides of Ohio v. Ameri-
can Express Co., 33 ANTITRUST 8, 15 (2018) (introducing a collection of contribu-
tions dealing with the AmEx decision).
6. See, e.g., Associated Press, Supreme Court Sides with AmEx in Lawsuit over
Rules for Merchants, WASH. POST (June 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
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In his opinion for the Court, Justice Thomas concluded for a five-
member majority that the plaintiffs had failed to make a prima facie
showing—as required at the first stage of rule of reason analysis—
that the defendant’s antisteering provisions gave rise to an anticompe-
titive effect, thus foreclosing liability under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Justice Breyer’s dissent for four members of the Court accused
the majority of ignoring elementary antitrust principles and neglect-
ing an ample record of anticompetitive effects.
While the two opinions diverge on a number of issues, the most
significant disagreement relates to market definition. Specifically, a
majority of the Court held that the relevant market for the antitrust
assessment of the antisteering provisions should include services and
customers on both sides of the platform: that is, both merchant and
cardholder services.7 The dissent protested that this market definition
violated the cardinal antitrust principle that relevant markets can in-
clude only substitutable products and services.8 By this logic, because
cardholder services are not substitutable for merchant services, the
relevant market in AmEx—and the assessment of prima facie compet-
itive effects—should have included only the merchant side of the
platform.9
These dueling opinions have sparked a minor cottage industry in
AmEx exegesis (in which this Article gladly participates), as scholars
and practitioners attempt to work out what the decision implies for
future Sherman Act cases involving multisided platforms (and cases
arguably involving multisided platforms10). Although the AmEx ma-
jority restricted the scope of its analysis to cases involving “transac-
tion platforms” for which a sale on one side of platform must occur
simultaneously with a sale on the other side of a platform, readers
.com/business/economy/supreme-court-sides-with-amex-in-lawsuit-over-rules-for-
merchants/2018/06/25/c6118978-7887-11e8-80be-6d32e182a3bc_story.html?nore
direct=on&utm_term=.ada1ed3f3037 [https://perma.unl.edu/9GZ9-FALP]; Tim
Wu, The Supreme Court Devastates Antitrust Law, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/opinion/supreme-court-american-express
.html [https://perma.unl.edu/RBD7-3J39]; Chris Sagers, Ohio v. American Ex-
press: Clarence Thomas Sets Sail on a Sea of Doubt, and, Mirabile Dictu, It’s Still
a Bad Idea, PRO-MARKET (June 27, 2018), https://promarket.org/ohio-v-american-
express-clarence-thomas-sets-sail-sea-doubt-mirabile-dictu-still-bad-idea/ [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/TEQ6-AY8A].
7. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285–87 (2018).
8. Id. at 2299 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 2299–300.
10. A sound definition of a multisided platform is surprisingly difficult to devise and
apply in practice. See Katz & Sallet, supra note 5, at 2148–51 (identifying difficul-
ties in defining the term); see also Brief of Open Markets Institute as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 9, Ohio v. American Express Co., 138 S. Ct.
2274 (2018) (No. 16-1454) (“Pegging a fundamental inquiry in antitrust analysis
to a concept that has no clear parameters is dangerous. It will encourage a wide
swath of firms to seek shelter under this more permissive approach.”).
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from Justice Breyer onward have noted that the logics of the majority
opinion may not easily be confined to such platforms.11 Thus, AmEx
appears to have raised more questions than it has answered. And, as
multisided platforms are ubiquitous in commerce, those questions cast
a long shadow over a wide variety of industries, including (in addition
to credit and payment cards): online dating sites, online search, cable
television, online marketplaces, physical marketplaces, operating sys-
tems, applications software, social media, newspapers and magazines,
smartphones, medical conferences, vacation rental networks, job
search networks, insurance networks, restaurant reservation systems,
and ride-sharing services.
In this Article, we set out one account of what AmEx could mean
for market definition in future antitrust cases. We argue that, while
the conventional view of market definition (which we will call the Uni-
tary View) holds that market definition must be approached in the
same way in all the stages of an antitrust analysis—such that, for
example, the correct relevant market in which to analyze market
power is automatically the correct relevant market in which to assess
competitive effects—the AmEx majority opinion suggests a different
approach. We offer an alternative view (which we call the Plural
View), according to which the principles of market definition may vary
with the antitrust analysis being considered. Specifically, we claim
that market definition for the purposes of determining market power
and market definition for the purposes of measuring competitive ef-
fects need not involve the application of the same rules, and need not
produce the same answers. And if market definition is ultimately an
exercise in defining which market participants and activities matter
for the purposes of antitrust analysis, our basic claim is that different
sets of market participants and activities may matter for different
purposes.
We reserve for another day, and for a lengthier writing, the many
broader questions raised by the Plural View. In particular, we do not
offer a general account of when and to what extent the principles of
market definition should be differentiated. Instead, by way of a start-
ing point, we offer here the tentative view that the “substitutability
principle”—according to which an antitrust market contains reasona-
ble substitutes from the perspective of the demand side of the market,
and only such reasonable substitutes—is an appropriate yardstick
when measuring market power, but it may not be an adequate mea-
sure for assessing competitive effects in every Section 1 case.
We offer an alternative market definition principle for the assess-
ment of competitive effects in Section 1 cases. Under this principle
(which we call the integrity principle), the relevant market in which to
11. See AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2297–301.
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assess competitive effects must include the direct effects of the chal-
lenged conduct as well as any effects of the conduct that the defendant
has the ability and incentive to engage in because of the challenged
conduct. Relevant markets defined based on the integrity principle
may be broader than conventional substitution-based markets. In a
case involving conduct by a company operating a two-sided platform,
the integrity principle implies that activities and effects on both sides
of the platform should be included in a competitive effects analysis
when and only when—as in AmEx itself—the challenged conduct on
one side of the platform gives the defendant the ability and incentive
to engage in conduct, impose term, or otherwise create effects on the
other. We argue that this principle not only sets a logical bound to
AmEx’s single-market approach in Section 1 cases, but that it is
grounded in and consistent with existing practices with respect to the
antitrust analysis of both conduct and mergers.
To be clear, we address here only the question of which activities
and entities should be included in the definition of a relevant antitrust
market for effects analysis under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. We do
not argue that procompetitive benefits should be assessed in the first
stage of a rule of reason analysis under Section 1. It is elementary that
a plaintiff’s burden at this first stage is limited to a showing of an-
ticompetitive effects, not a rebuttal of asserted procompetitive bene-
fits. Our argument concerns only the scope of the competitive effects
analysis, not the content of the test itself. And we offer no view at all
on Section 2, which differs in some important ways from Section 1.
We find in the AmEx decision, thus, both the seeds of a broader
principle—the Plural View of market definition—and the seeds of the
decision’s own limiting principle—the integrity principle. We resist, in
particular, the simplistic view that AmEx holds that “the relevant
market” in a so-called “platform case,” whether the platform is trans-
actional or not, always includes both (or all) sides of the platform.
There are no special rules for platforms, or for transactional plat-
forms, in our reading of either Section 1 of the Sherman Act or the
AmEx decision itself.
We set out our argument in three Parts. Part II provides basic
background on the AmEx decision. Part III sets out the orthodox Uni-
tary View of market definition, and explains why our Plural View is
preferable. Part IV takes a first step toward working out the broader
implications of the Plural View—and a guide to keeping AmEx within
its proper domain—by explaining why the substitutability principle
arguably should not serve as a complete measure of market definition
in the evaluation of competitive effects. We further discuss in Part IV
how the integrity principle both explains the AmEx outcome and
meshes neatly with existing antitrust principles.
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II. THE AMEX MAJORITY OPINION
A. Overview
AmEx concerned an antitrust challenge to American Express’s an-
tisteering rules that prohibited merchants from guiding customers
away from American Express cards at the point of sale. American Ex-
press had entered into agreements with merchants that prohibited the
merchants from “implying a preference for non-Amex cards; dissuad-
ing customers from using Amex cards; persuading customers to use
other cards; imposing any special restrictions, conditions, disadvan-
tages, or fees on Amex cards; or promoting other cards more than
Amex.”12 A group of government plaintiffs—the United States and a
number of States—challenged those restrictions as anticompetitive re-
straints of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1, and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York entered judgment for the plaintiffs following a bench trial.13 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the
plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of anticompetitive
effects in a correctly defined relevant antitrust market.14
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in the majority
opinion authored by Justice Thomas, over a dissent by Justice Breyer
for four members of the Court, affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.15 Justice Thomas’s majority opinion articulated two central
holdings relating respectively to market definition and anticompeti-
tive effects: (1) a single antitrust market should be defined to include
both the services provided by American Express to cardholders and
the services provided by American Express to merchants;16 and (2) ap-
plying that market definition, the plaintiffs had failed to discharge
their burden to show prima facie anticompetitive effects (as the first
stage of the rule of reason analysis required), for they had relied en-
tirely for the purpose on a showing of higher nominal prices for ser-
vices to merchants, without regard to output and quality on the
merchant side of the platform or to effects of any kind on services to
cardholders.17 We shall discuss each of these holdings in detail.
B. Market Definition
The Court began with the proposition that market definition is a
necessary element of rule of reason analysis, at least in vertical
12. Id. at 2283.
13. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d, 838
F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016).
14. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d at 195–206.
15. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. 2274.
16. Id. at 2285–87.
17. Id. at 2287–90.
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cases.18 The Court then undertook that exercise. The district court
had determined after trial that the transactional services provided by
American Express to cardholders, on the one hand, and those provided
to merchants, on the other, were supplied in separate antitrust mar-
kets.19 On the face of it, this was an unsurprising conclusion. After all,
the services provided by American Express to cardholders and the ser-
vices provided to merchants were different in kind, and were not sub-
stitutable for one another. Cardholders received a revolving line of
credit and various collateral membership benefits, and merchants re-
ceived transactional handling services.20 Plainly, these were not sub-
stitutes: cardholders could not look to merchant services as
alternatives for the service they received, nor could merchants look to
cardholder services. For this reason, Judge Garaufis in the District
Court—in a conclusion subsequently echoed by Justice Breyer for the
dissenting Justices21—had concluded that the two sides of the credit
card platform constituted two separate, albeit interrelated, antitrust
markets.22
Nevertheless (and despite the incredulity of Justice Breyer’s dis-
sent23), a majority of the Supreme Court followed the Second Circuit
in reaching the contrary conclusion,24 holding that a single antitrust
market should be defined to embrace transactional services on both
sides of the credit card platform.25 The majority identified three dis-
tinctive features of the services provided to merchants and the ser-
vices provided to cardholders that, in the view of the Court, justified
their aggregation into a single market:
• First, the Court emphasized the simultaneous and joint nature
of consumption on the two sides: credit card platforms “cannot
make a sale unless both sides of the platform simultaneously
18. Id. at 2285–87.
19. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 171–75 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
20. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2280.
21. Id. at 2297–301 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The relevant question is whether
merchant-related and shopper-related services are substitutes, one for the other,
so that customers can respond to a price increase for one service by switching to
the other service. As I have explained, the two types of services are not substi-
tutes in this way.”).
22. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 171–75 (“[E]ach constituent product market in
this industry is distinct, involving different sets of rivals and the sale of separate,
though interrelated, products and services to separate groups of consumers.”).
23. See, e.g., AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2299 (“Nothing in antitrust law, to my knowledge,
suggests that a court, when presented with an agreement that restricts competi-
tion in any one of the markets my examples suggest, should abandon traditional
market-definition approaches and include in the relevant market services that
are complements, not substitutes, of the restrained good.”).
24. United States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 196–200 (2d Cir. 2016).
25. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2278.
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agree to use their services,”26 and the service provided is
“jointly consumed by a cardholder, who uses the payment card
to make a transaction, and a merchant, who accepts the pay-
ment card as a method of payment.”27
• Second, the Court emphasized the existence of close and
bidirectional interrelation of price and demand on the two
sides: “to optimize sales, the network must find the balance of
pricing that encourages the greatest number of matches be-
tween cardholders and merchants,” given that “two-sided
transaction platforms exhibit more pronounced indirect net-
work effects and interconnected pricing and demand.”28
• Third, the Court emphasized the fact that inter-platform com-
petition is the dominant mode of competitive interaction:
“[o]nly other two-sided platforms can compete with a two-sided
platform for transactions. . . . A credit-card company that
processed transactions for merchants, but that had no card-
holders willing to use its card, could not compete with Amex.”29
C. Analysis of Competitive Effects
Having defined a single market for credit card services, the Court
then turned its attention to the appraisal of competitive effects in that
market. The Court went on to hold that the mere showing of an in-
crease in nominal price to purchasers on one side of the American Ex-
press platform (here, “all merchants,” in a market that had been
defined to include both merchants and cardholders) did not, absent
any evidence of effects on the other side of the market, suffice to dis-
charge the plaintiffs’ burden to show prima facie anticompetitive ef-
fects in the market as a whole.30
The Court began its analysis of this issue with the proposition that
an anticompetitive effect can be shown either directly or indirectly,
with different requirements of pleading and proof in each case:
The plaintiffs can [show anticompetitive effects] directly or indirectly. Direct
evidence of anticompetitive effects would be proof of actual detrimental effects
on competition . . . such as reduced output, increased prices, or decreased
26. Id. at 2286; see also id. (“These platforms facilitate a single, simultaneous trans-
action . . . . [Platforms] cannot sell transaction services to either cardholders or
merchants individually.”).
27. Id. (quoting Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lerner, Kevin M. Murphy, & Lacey
Plache, Competition in Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics of Payment
Card Interchange Fees, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 580 (2006)).
28. Id. But see id. at 2300 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the role of this element
is not clearly specified by the Court despite its foundational importance in the
literature).
29. Id. at 2287 (citation omitted).
30. Id.
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quality in the relevant market . . . . Indirect evidence would be proof of market
power plus some evidence that the challenged restraint harms competition.31
Crucially, the Court explained that the plaintiffs in AmEx itself had
“rel[ied] exclusively on direct evidence”—and, particularly, proof of in-
creased prices to merchants—to show anticompetitive effects.32 The
Court was at pains to emphasize that plaintiffs had chosen to “stake
their entire case on proving that Amex’s agreements increase
merchant fees.”33
The majority went on conclude that the plaintiffs had failed to
meet their burden under the first stage of rule of reason analysis—
which requires a prima facie showing of anticompetitive effects34—in
two critical respects. First, the Court explained, the plaintiffs failed to
adduce evidence of adverse output and quality effects upon the ser-
vices provided to merchants, leaving open the prospect that increased
fees—that is, higher nominal prices—could have simply reflected su-
perior quality, increased costs, and/or increased demand.35 The fact
that the fees of American Express’s competitors, Visa and Mastercard,
had also increased over time suggested to the Court that merchant fee
increases occurred because of increased competition for cardholders
among credit card networks.36 “[D]ramatic” increases in demand for
credit card transactions—a 30% increase between 2008 to 2013—pro-
vided another, competitively benign, explanation for the increase in
fees.37 The Court also found that the provision of a “more robust re-
wards program” than those offered by competitors provided an equally
plausible explanation for American Express’s higher merchant fees.38
Thus, the mere evidence of higher nominal merchant fees was not pro-
bative of pricing that was actually supracompetitive.
Second, the plaintiffs had failed to adduce evidence of price, out-
put, and quality effects upon cardholders—which, based on the
31. Id. at 2284 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 2284–85.
33. Id. at 2287.
34. See, e.g., In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 271–72 (6th Cir. 2014)
(describing the first step of the rule of reason analysis in detail); United States v.
Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
35. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2288 (“Amex’s increased merchant fees reflect increases in
the value of its services and the cost of its transactions, not an ability to charge
above a competitive price.”).
36. Id. (“Visa and MasterCard’s merchant fees have continued to increase, even at
merchant locations where Amex is not accepted and, thus, Amex’s antisteering
provisions do not apply. This suggests that the cause of increased merchant fees
is not Amex’s antisteering provisions, but rather increased competition for card-
holders and a corresponding marketwide adjustment in the relative price charged
to merchants.”) (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 2288–89.
38. Id. at 2288 (“Amex uses its higher merchant fees to offer its cardholders a more
robust rewards program, which is necessary to maintain cardholder loyalty and
encourage the level of spending that makes Amex valuable to merchants.”).
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Court’s market definition holding, were consumers in the very same
market.39 This left open the prospect that while prices had risen for
some purchasers (i.e., merchants), they might have fallen for others
(specifically for cardholders), and in fact might have remained flat or
fallen considering the market as a whole.40 As a general matter, the
mere allocation of pricing burden from one subset of purchasers in a
market to another subset of purchasers is, of course, not evidence of
anticompetitive effects or of reduced output overall.41 As a result, the
Court concluded, there was no basis on which to conclude that credit
card transactions were priced at a supracompetitive level.42
In a final section, the Court went further and appeared to consider
whether the plaintiffs had established—as would be required in order
to prove anticompetitive effects indirectly—whether the provisions
had “stifled competition,” by which the Court appeared to mean some-
thing like the infliction of harm to, or distortion of, the competitive
process itself, rather than a change to familiar outcomes like price,
output, and quality.43 Here, the Court denied that the record provided
evidence of harm to the competitive process, noting in qualitative
terms that credit card platforms were engaging in what appeared to
be vigorous inter-platform competition undeterred by the anti-steer-
ing rules: Visa and MasterCard had been “spurred” to offer new pre-
mium cards and increase the availability of card services; “fierce
competition” had constrained Amex’s ability to raise fees, and on occa-
sion forced it to lower them; and Visa, MasterCard, and Discover had,
by charging lower fees, won acceptance at roughly three million more
locations than American Express.44
The Court finally considered whether there was anything “inher-
ently anticompetitive” about the anti-steering rule that would justify
39. See supra section II.B.
40. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2287 (“Focusing on merchant fees alone misses the mark
because the product that credit-card companies sell is transactions, not services
to merchants, and the competitive effects of a restraint on transactions cannot be
judged by looking at merchants alone. Evidence of a price increase on one side of
a two-sided transaction platform cannot by itself demonstrate an anticompetitive
exercise of market power.”).
41. Id. at 2288 (“That Amex allocates prices between merchants and cardholders dif-
ferently from Visa and MasterCard is simply not evidence that it wields market
power to achieve anticompetitive ends.”) (citation omitted); see generally Benja-
min Klein & John Shepard Wiley Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an An-
titrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J.
599 (2003).
42. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2288 (“The plaintiffs did not offer any evidence that the price
of credit-card transactions was higher than the price one would expect to find in a
competitive market. As the District Court found, the plaintiffs failed to offer any
reliable measure of Amex’s transaction price or profit margins.”) (emphasis ad-
ded) (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 2289–90.
44. Id. at 2289.
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an inference of competitive harm notwithstanding this qualitative evi-
dence of robust competition. It concluded that there was not, as the
provisions helped to protect investments in the American Express net-
work and to discourage conduct by members that undermined its
value, without preventing competing platforms from offering lower
fees or otherwise attracting merchants.45 Having thus concluded that
neither direct nor indirect evidence supported a prima facie finding of
anticompetitive effects, nothing was left but to affirm the Second
Circuit.
III. AMEX AND A “PLURAL VIEW” OF MARKET DEFINITION
On its face, AmEx appears to be a brazen—almost outrageous—
departure from the settled law of market definition. It is the most fa-
miliar of antitrust fundamentals that a properly defined antitrust
market must be defined to include reasonable substitutes, and only
reasonable substitutes, for a particular product or service.46 Before
the AmEx opinion came down, one could have been forgiven for think-
ing, as Richard Brunell put it, that “any Supreme Court Justice with a
modicum of antitrust expertise would recognize the error of the Sec-
ond Circuit’s combining complementary products in the same relevant
market, especially with Professor Hovenkamp explaining the mistake
in his treatise and in a professors’ amicus brief.”47
And yet a majority of the Supreme Court found that merchant and
cardholder services—services that are clearly not substitutes—should
be analyzed in a single antitrust market, even though no merchant
could or would look to a cardholder service as a substitute for what it
was receiving, or had been receiving, qua merchant.48 In doing so, the
45. Id. at 2289–90.
46. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395
(1956) (Reed, J., for a plurality of the Court) (“In considering what is the relevant
market for determining the control of price and competition, no more definite rule
can be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers
for the same purposes make up that ‘part of the trade or commerce’, monopoliza-
tion of which may be illegal.”); accord Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 37 n.7 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962); Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public
Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 435–36 (3d Cir. 2016); Chapman v. N.Y. State Div. for
Youth, 546 F.3d 230, 237–38 (2d Cir. 2008); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES] (“Market definition focuses solely on demand substitution
factors[.]”); id. at § 4.1 (“[A] relevant product market consists of a group of substi-
tute products[.]”).
47. Richard M. Brunell, Ohio v. Amex: Not So Bad After All?, 33 ANTITRUST 1, 16
(2018).
48. As the dissent noted: “Merchants upset about a price increase for merchant-re-
lated services cannot avoid that price increase by becoming cardholders, in the
way that, say, a buyer of newspaper advertising can switch to television advertis-
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Court appears to have violated the substitutability principle. Unsur-
prisingly, the Court’s approach to market definition has featured
prominently in the decision’s many critical treatments.49 Tim Wu’s re-
action is representative: “Market definitions are determined by evalu-
ating available substitutions, yet somehow the credit card market
includes services that could not possibly be substitutes. (How can
cardholder and merchant services be interchangeable?)”50
But this view—on which market definition is, and should simply
be, about reasonable substitutability, and on which the Court decision
was simply wrongheaded—may be misleading.51 In its place, this Part
sets out a more appealing account, on which AmEx suggests a refine-
ment of fundamental principles of market definition, rather than a
flat challenge to them. Specifically, we claim that the majority opinion
can be understood as a challenge to the notion (the Unitary View) that
there should be a single consistent definition of “the relevant market”
in an antitrust case, and as an intimation that, in place of that notion,
we should appreciate that different principles of market definition
may apply depending on the purpose of the market definition exercise
(the Plural View).
We acknowledge that one could, with some difficulty, shoehorn the
AmEx opinion into compatibility with the substitutability principle
(by leaning hard on the putative “transactional” nature of the plat-
form, and the associated claim that American Express was only sup-
plying a single product—transactions—that was consumed jointly and
simultaneously by merchant-cardholder pairs), but we think that ef-
fort unnecessary for reasons that we explain below. Instead, we offer
ing or direct mail in response to a newspaper’s advertising price increase.” AmEx,
138 S. Ct. at 2296.
49. See, e.g., Katz & Sallet, supra note 5, at 2155 (criticizing the “single market” con-
clusion as “violating the principle of substitution.”); Sagers, supra note 5; Tim
Wu, The American Express Opinion, Tech Platforms & the Rule of Reason, J.
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 6) (on file with au-
thor) (“At bottom, the approach announced [by] the Court is unprecedented, pro-
cedurally indefensible, unnecessarily complex, and ultimately incoherent.”);
Pallavi Guniganti, AmEx Ruling is an “Economic Nightmare,” Hovenkamp Says,
GLOB. COMPETITION REV. (Sept. 7, 2018), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/arti
cle/usa/1173902/amex-ruling-is-an-“economic-nightmare”-hovenkamp-says
[https://perma.unl.edu/S8EC-MD9U].
50. Wu, supra note 49, at 6.
51. Others have, of course, offered alternative readings of what “really” drove the
outcome in AmEx. See, e.g., Joshua H. Soven & Thu Hoang, More Old News than
New News in American Express 33(1) ANTITRUST 22, 22 (Fall 2018) (arguing that
the government’s case in Ohio v. Am. Express Co. was deficient in several re-
spects, including Amex’s low market share, lack of specific evidence of consumer
harm, a plausible procompetitive rationale, and the plaintiffs’ abstract, complex
theory of harm).
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the Plural View as a well-fitting, aptly justified reading—that is, an
appealing interpretation—of the AmEx majority opinion.52
A. The Unitary View
We start with the standard view of market definition, the Unitary
View, which can be introduced briefly in the following terms. The defi-
nition of a relevant antitrust market is the first and foundational step
in everyday antitrust analysis, setting aside cases of per se illegality
and other anomalies. In most antitrust cases, a court or antitrust
agency starts by considering the relevant product(s) or service(s) pro-
vided by the defendant. It then defines a market (or a set of markets)
to include reasonable substitutes for each such relevant product or
service and determines whether or not the defendant has significant
market power in a market thus defined. It proceeds in light of that
conclusion to evaluate whether the challenged conduct or transaction
has or will have exclusionary or other anticompetitive effects in some
market that was defined in the initial market definition step, in light
of any proven efficiencies in that market (efficiencies or other benefits
in other markets being, of course, generally immaterial in standard
antitrust analysis53).
This thumbnail sketch is brief and inadequate in a variety of ways,
but the crucial point for present purposes is that market definition(s)
remain(s) constant throughout all stages of the antitrust analysis. The
Unitary View is the premise that it would be an analytical and doctri-
nal error to define, in a single case, a market one way for one purpose
and another way for another purpose. If Coke and Dr. Pepper, lemons
and limes, or trains and planes are in the same market for one pur-
pose in an antitrust case, they are in the same market for all purposes
in that antitrust case. A lower court, antitrust agency, or litigant do-
ing anything else would be vulnerable to the criticism of inconsistency
in the fundamentals of its antitrust analysis. And it is virtually axio-
matic that plaintiffs guilty of inconsistency in their market definitions
52. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 67 (1998) (discussing fit and justification as
objectives of interpretation).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (“If an-
ticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by pro-competitive conse-
quences in another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry
could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would make it in
the end as large as the industry leader.”); Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34
F.3d 1091, 1112 (1st Cir.1994) (stating “it seems improper to validate a practice
that is decidedly in restraint of trade simply because the practice produces some
unrelated benefits to competition in another market.”); see also United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611 (1972) (“If a decision is to be made to sacri-
fice competition in one portion of the economy for greater competition in another
portion this . . . is a decision that must be made by Congress and not by private
forces or by the courts.”).
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can expect dismissal, and that courts adopting them can expect
reversal.54
The everyday work of the federal district courts is full of examples
of the view that a single market definition must apply throughout an
antitrust case, embracing both the assessment of market or monopoly
power and the appraisal of competitive effects. The following state-
ments in court decisions are just some of the examples:
• “In antitrust cases, the purpose of considering a plaintiff’s pro-
posed relevant market is to determine whether the plaintiff has
plausibly alleged that the defendant has restrained trade in the
market through its unlawful actions or maintains monopoly
power over that market.”55
• “[A] plaintiff [in a rule of reason case] must show that the de-
fendants’ conduct has an anticompetitive effect in a relevant
market, and that the defendants have market power in that
market.”56
• “In a Rule of Reason analysis, a precise market definition is re-
quired for the petitioner to be able to demonstrate that a defen-
dant wields sufficient market power to establish an unlawful
conspiracy. . . . [Even under the quick look approach] the peti-
tioner still has the burden to identify the ‘rough contours’ of the
market, . . . so that a court can determine whether the respon-
dent’s actions have anticompetitive effects on that market.”57
• “Determining the relevant market enables the court to assess
whether the defendant has monopoly power in that market,
what the area of competition is, and whether the allegedly un-
lawful acts have anticompetitive effects in that market.”58
But this is not just a matter of the language used in antitrust
cases; it is also part of the received understanding of how antitrust
doctrine works—how, in fact, it is taught and learned. Treatises and
articles routinely consider “market definition” as a free-standing topic,
unitary in its conception, without suggesting that the right approach
to the market definition question—meaning both the answer and the
54. See, e.g., TechReserves Inc. v. Delta Controls Inc., No. 13 Civ. 752(GBD), 2014
WL 1325914, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (dismissing an antitrust complaint
where plaintiff described the relevant product market in “varying, inconsistent,
and imprecise terms”).
55. Process Controls Int’l, Inc. v. Emerson Process Mgmt., No. 4:10CV645 CDP, 2011
WL 403121, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 1, 2011) (emphasis added).
56. United States ex rel. Blaum v. Triad Isotopes, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 3d 901, 923 (N.D.
Ill. 2015) (emphasis added).
57. Acuity Optical Labs, LLC v. Davis Vision, Inc., 14-cv-03231, 2016 WL 4467883, at
*12 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
58. Cupp v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 2d 963, 969 (W.D. Tenn. 2004)
(emphasis added).
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rules applied to find it—might depend on the stage of the antitrust
analysis at which one asks the question. For example, the ubiquitous
(and invaluable) two-volume standard practitioners’ text Antitrust
Law Developments addresses “Relevant Market” in a free-standing
chapter of its own, without suggesting that the principles of market
definition might vary according to the element of an antitrust case for
which it is being applied.59
In virtually all its manifestations, the Unitary View of market defi-
nition involves the primacy of the principle of demand-side reasonable
substitutability. This substitutability principle is, as Justice Breyer
accurately put it, the principle that:
Once a court has identified the good or service directly restrained, it will
sometimes add to the relevant market . . . other goods or services that are
reasonably substitutable for that good or service. . . . The reason that substi-
tutes are included in the relevant market is that they restrain a firm’s ability
to profitably raise prices, because customers will switch to the substitutes
rather than pay the higher prices.60
A chorus of federal courts, including, on more than one occasion,
the U.S. Supreme Court, have emphasized the primacy of the sub-
stitutability principle.61 So too have the U.S. antitrust agencies in
their operative merger guidelines.62
We acknowledge that the Court may have intended to reconcile its
market definition in AmEx with the Unitary View, and with the sub-
stitutability principle, by emphasizing the transactional nature of
credit card networks. The key analytical move in this direction is to
treat American Express as supplying a single product or service—es-
sentially, credit card transactions—to pairs of cardholders and
merchants who have already agreed to transact with one another and
who now, in some sense, go out jointly and simultaneously to choose a
payment method. Under those circumstances, the platform is hardly
two-sided at all. On this view, American Express just faces a single
demand curve in which the consumers are cardholder-merchant pairs.
The reasonable substitutes for American Express’s credit card trans-
actions are therefore whatever alternatives those cardholder-
merchant pairs might so consider. The Court seems to have made at
least some efforts to be understood in this vein:
59. 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 579–630
(ABA ed., 8th ed. 2017).
60. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2295 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
61. See supra note 46 (citing cases).
62. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at 7 (“Market definition focuses
solely on demand substitution factors, i.e., on customers’ ability and willingness
to substitute away from one product to another in response to a price increase or
a corresponding non-price change such as a reduction in product quality or
service.”).
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[T]wo-sided transaction platforms . . . facilitate a single, simultaneous trans-
action between participants. For credit cards, the network can sell its services
only if a merchant and cardholder both simultaneously choose to use the net-
work. Thus, whenever a credit-card network sells one transaction’s worth of
card-acceptance services to a merchant it also must sell one transaction’s
worth of card-payment services to a cardholder. It cannot sell transaction ser-
vices to either cardholders or merchants individually . . . .
Because they cannot make a sale unless both sides of the platform simultane-
ously agree to use their services, two-sided transaction platforms exhibit more
pronounced indirect network effects and interconnected pricing and demand.
Transaction platforms are thus better understood as supplying only one prod-
uct—transactions. . . . In the credit-card market, these transactions are jointly
consumed by a cardholder, who uses the payment card to make a transaction,
and a merchant, who accepts the payment card as a method of payment.63
This is just about colorable enough to serve the turn for those who
wish to defend the Unitary View and the substitutability principle
within it. But it is an awfully strained reading. For one thing, the no-
tion that cardholders and merchants jointly and simultaneously con-
sume credit card transaction services is false.
The decision about which payment method to use is taken neither
jointly, nor is it a simultaneous decision taken after some antecedent
agreement-to-transact (as if simultaneity mattered; it is hard to see
why it would). Rather, at time 1 a merchant makes a decision about
whether to become a member in the network (and thus to avail itself of
American Express’s payment acceptance services qua accepting
merchant, in light of the benefits and costs of doing so) in light of the
alternatives. At time 2, a cardholder makes a decision about whether
to carry an American Express card in light of the alternatives. At time
3 a cardholder chooses whether or not to purchase some article or ser-
vice from the merchant and unilaterally elects a payment method
from among those accepted by the merchant. The cardholder is
purchasing the credit card transaction-handling services “jointly” with
the merchant only in the sense that the cardholder is also “jointly”
purchasing whatever inputs went into whatever article or service the
merchant chooses to offer and the consumer chooses to buy: the nails
in the furniture, the baseband processor in the cellphone, or the labor
in the garment. This is hardly a basis for antitrust special treatment,
as Justice Breyer was right to observe.64
Moreover, the notion that American Express supplies a single
product (transactions) to consumers who are cardholder-merchant
pairs, and that it faces a single demand curve in supplying those
transactions, is arguably at odds with the analytical treatment of
American Express as a two-sided platform. Instead, a two-sided plat-
form connects users on opposite sides of the platform by charging each
63. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations
omitted).
64. Id. at 2297–301 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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side its own price for its own product or service. In fact, the key ele-
ment of a two-sided platform is that price structure—not just overall
price level—matters for platform demand.65 Thus, the platform sets
prices to users on each side based on the distinct demand curves that
it faces on each side.
The Court, which relies heavily on American Express being a two-
sided platform in its market definition finding, also highlights the im-
portance of balancing prices between the two sides of a credit card
network: “To optimize sales, the network must find the balance of
pricing that encourages the greatest number of matches between card-
holders and merchants.”66 If American Express really faced a single
demand curve of jointly consuming pairs there would be no two-sided
dynamics in play at all. It is the very fact that the business sees two
demand curves, not one, that puts two-sided dynamics at issue.
We claim that the effort to reconcile AmEx with the Unitary View
and with the substitutability principle is at best unnecessary and is in
fact misguided. Rather, with a little work—for we acknowledge that
the majority opinion is, undeniably, “exceedingly murky”67 on this
point—AmEx can be understood as highlighting a challenge to the
Unitary View by demonstrating the operation of an alternative that
we call the Plural View, and exemplifying why the substitutability
principle is an undesirable standard when we are concerned with the
evaluation of competitive effects.
B. The Plural View
On the Plural View, which we offer in place of the Unitary View,
the right approach to market definition is a function of the purpose for
which a market is being defined; in particular, the Plural View indi-
cates that there is at least a distinction between market definition for
the purposes of finding market power, on the one hand, and market
definition for the purposes of determining whether some relevant con-
duct has caused anticompetitive effects, on the other. Our claim is
that, because the purpose of market definition is different in (at least)
these two contexts, the desirable rules for market definition may like-
wise be different.
The Unitary View—that the substitutability principle should gov-
ern market definition for all purposes—is orthodox today, but it was
not always so. Courts did not adopt the substitutability principle for
65. See, e.g., Rochet & Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS’N 990, 1018 (2003) (stating that “markets in which only the total per
transaction price charged by the platform matters and not its decomposition be-
tween end users” should be treated as one-sided).
66. AmEx, 138 S. Ct. at 2286 (emphasis added).
67. Brunell, supra note 48, at 17.
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relevant market definition until the early 1950s.68 And before United
States v. Grinnell Corporation, scholars and courts mused on the prob-
lem of whether market definition in Clayton Act cases should be the
same as in Sherman Act cases;69 the Supreme Court eventually set-
tled the debate by holding that the same market definition principles
apply in both Clayton Act and Sherman Act cases.70
The crux of our argument for the Plural View is that the logic of
the use of the substitutability principle in cases involving the assess-
ment of market power does not always extend to market definition for
the purpose of assessing competitive effects of challenged conduct. As
many have observed, market definition is a tool of antitrust analysis
and not an end in itself.71 Other than the virtue of simplicity, we see
no good reason to insist that the best tool for market definition in one
context is invariably the best in another. Tools should serve the needs
of analysis, not vice versa. In an antitrust case, the process of market
definition is not a process of finding a “correct market definition” that
just is, out there in the world; it is a process of defining a contour
around a set of entities and practices on which we decide to focus for
some reason. The “right” approach to market definition is therefore a
function of that reason and this may counsel different approaches if
market definition is being undertaken in service of different
objectives.
The measurement of market power and the measurement of com-
petitive effects do indeed serve different objectives in an antitrust
case. Specifically, we measure market power primarily as a screening
exercise. The point is essentially to determine whether a defendant (in
a conduct case) or transactional party (in a transactional case) is able
to inflict competitive harm on some set of customers, such that further
analysis into the nature and effects of challenged conduct or a chal-
lenged transaction—including an evaluation of the efficiency-based
justifications for any actual or anticipated anticompetitive effects—is
warranted.72 The analysis of market power serves a gatekeeping func-
68. Gregory Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REV.
123, 124 & 128–29 (1992). See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
69. Werden, supra note 68, at 141–48.
70. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 573 (“We see no reason to differentiate between ‘line’
of commerce in the context of the Clayton Act and ‘part’ of commerce for purposes
of the Sherman Act.”).
71. See, e.g., Katz & Sallet, supra note 5, at 2152; Robert Harris & Thomas Jorde,
Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1984).
72. See, e.g., Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc., 354 F.3d 661, 663 (7th
Cir. 2004) (“The first requirement in every suit based on the Rule of Reason is
market power, without which the practice cannot cause those injuries (lower out-
put and the associated welfare losses) that matter under the federal antitrust
laws”) (citations omitted).
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tion to ensure that it is worth putting the adjudicator and the parties
to the considerable trouble of parsing (and/or defending) the actual
impact of the challenged practice against some counterfactual world.
We look at the status of the entity qua supplier to ask whether it is
necessary to go to the trouble of isolating and evaluating the effects of
specific conduct in which that supplier has engaged. Analysis of mar-
ket power, in sum, is a “screen.”73
By contrast, the purpose of measuring competitive effects is to de-
termine whether a specific challenged practice or transaction is, in
fact, harmful in the ways that the antitrust laws aim to avoid.74 In
other words, it serves as a measure of the overall legality of the con-
duct in question.
Not only do the analysis of market power and the analysis of com-
petitive effects serve different functions in the abstract, but they also
take place in the shadow of different concerns as part of the litigation
process. The role of competitive effects analysis in a Section 1 case is
not to screen but to scrutinize: at this stage we are asking about the
concrete effects of the practice in order to be sure that we are neither
condemning blameless conduct (i.e., false positives to the liability
question) nor rubber-stamping conduct that is genuinely harmful (i.e.,
false negatives). The goal in service of which market definition is un-
dertaken here is an accurate appraisal of actual overall economic
effects.75
The error costs here are considerable in both directions: the cost of
a false positive is not merely the imposition of liability (treble dam-
ages, no less, and perhaps far-reaching injunctive relief as well) on a
defendant that violated no law and/or inflicted no significant harm,
but also the deterrence of future welfare-enhancing conduct; the cost
of a false negative includes not only the continuation, but perhaps also
the express validation (and thus the active encouragement), of harm-
ful and unlawful conduct. When assessing competitive effects, we are
(or should be) strongly committed to the enterprise of figuring out
whether the challenged conduct is truly harmful in the ways that the
antitrust laws care about: we should be very concerned to avoid pun-
73. PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 418–19 (5th Cir.
2010) (“A market-power screen is thus compatible with Leegin and our precedent
and that of our sister circuits. To allege a vertical restraint claim sufficiently, a
plaintiff must plausibly allege the defendant’s market power.”). See also Alden F.
Abbott & D. Bruce Hoffman, Ohio v. American Express and the Continued Evolu-
tion of Economic Reasoning in Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 33 ANTITRUST 37,
41 (2018) (emphasizing that market definition, if correctly conducted, “tends to
reduce error costs—both false positives and false negatives.”).
74. See generally Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977) (defining antitrust injury).
75. See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977) (noting
that the primary concern of antitrust rules is “demonstrable economic effect”).
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ishing procompetitive or benign conduct and very concerned to avoid
endorsing harmful conduct.
Furthermore, it is also fairly clear that the analysis of competitive
effects is grounded in a concern with overall increase in price or an
overall loss of output, and that an analysis limited to an arbitrary sub-
set of affected participants will not do the trick. Could a plaintiff suc-
cessfully discharge its burden under the first stage of the rule of
reason by simply pointing to a price increase across a handful of
cherry-picked inelastic consumers? We would surely say no. If pressed
to explain why, we might say that a market-wide effect is necessary.76
But, then we would remember that “market definition is not an end in
itself but rather a tool”77 and so to justify this answer in terms of a
requirement of a posited need for a “market-wide effect” would be to
beg the question. After further reflection, our better response would be
that the rule of reason is aimed at an evaluation of the overall effects
of a challenged practice,78 and, therefore, the parties’ pleadings, argu-
ments, and evidence must, at each stage of the three-step burden-
shifting framework, be aimed at those overall effects, not the effects
on a cherry-picked arbitrary subset of customers whose experience of
the challenged practice was most favorable to one’s own case.
This is in marked contrast with the role of the market power test,
which is essentially a test of possibility (can this defendant wield the
kind of power that could be applied to generate anticompetitive ef-
fects?).79 If the defendant cannot injure the competitive process, there
is no need to go further and dig into the complexities and burdens of
working out whether it has in fact done so. Notice that error costs in
the analysis of market power are lower in both directions as compared
to the competitive effects assessment. The costs of a false negative
again include the validation of the harmful conduct, although this
time without a court’s active endorsement and encouragement of the
challenged practice (for, after all, what may be lawfully done by a com-
petitor without market power may not always be lawfully done by a
monopolist80). And, crucially, the costs of a false positive are much
76. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We have
consistently held an individual plaintiff personally aggrieved by an alleged anti-
competitive agreement has not suffered an antitrust injury unless the activity
has a wider impact on the competitive market.”) (citations omitted).
77. Katz & Sallet, supra note 5, at 2152.
78. See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 317 (3d Cir. 2010)
(rule of reason measures the “overall reasonableness of the restraint”) (internal
quotation and citation omitted).
79. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986) (“[T]he purpose
of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to determine whether
an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition”).
80. This is trivially true under Section 2, which is aimed only at those holding mo-
nopoly power or with a dangerous probability of obtaining it. See, e.g., Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993). It is also true in appropriate
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lower than those in the appraisal of competitive effects: here we do not
leap straight to the imposition of liability, the exaction of supra-com-
pensatory damages from a blameless defendant, and the swing of the
injunctive sword.
Rather, we simply proceed to the next stage of the analysis. Taking
the parties through that next step is no small thing: as the Supreme
Court most recently reminded us in Twombly, there are real costs to
allowing “a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim . . . to take up the
time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value.”81 But those costs
are certainly smaller than those of a liability finding. Second, and
more importantly, it is analytically unobjectionable to terminate the
analysis at the point where we have established impossibility of com-
petitive harm. If the defendant cannot injure the competitive process,
there is no need to go further and dig into the complexities and bur-
dens of working out whether it has in fact done so.
This difference of purpose and context between the assessment of
market power and the assessment of competitive effects implies a dif-
ference of methodology in the definition of a relevant market. The sub-
stitutability principle is apt when defining a market for the purposes
of market power assessment because overall anticompetitive effects
are unlikely when the defendant faces significant competitive con-
straint from reasonable substitutes. By contrast, when defining a
market for the purposes of competitive effects analysis, we are really
asking which entities we should count in measuring the actual or pre-
dicted harms and benefits of challenged conduct. And there is nothing
inherent in the normative foundations of the antitrust system that
tells us in some a priori sense that only those trafficking in reasonable
substitutes “count” in the relevant sense.
IV. AMEX AND THE INTEGRITY PRINCIPLE
AmEx can be read as an illustration of the Plural View in action,
and specifically as a demonstration that the substitutability principle
may not be suitable for every stage of an antitrust analysis. On this
view, where a court evaluates the competitive effects of challenged
conduct under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, as in AmEx itself, the
integrity principle provides a better foundation for market definition.
As we discussed earlier, the relevant market under the integrity prin-
ciple must incorporate the direct effects of the challenged conduct as
well as any effects of conduct that the defendant has the ability and
cases under Section 1. See, e.g., PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 418–19 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that market power is a
necessary element of liability in a challenge to a vertical restraint).
81. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (internal quotation and cita-
tions omitted).
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incentive to engage in because of the challenged conduct. The integrity
principle offers an appealing and simple explanation of the outcome in
AmEx, sets an appropriate limit on AmEx’s single-market analysis,
and coheres with existing antitrust principles.
When assessing competitive effects, we are generally concerned
with the overall effects of a challenged practice. As a matter of pure
principle, the natural starting point is all those affected by the prac-
tice, regardless of whether they are buying or selling reasonable sub-
stitutes or not. Focusing only on a subset of those harmed or benefited
will distort the measurement of the effects of a challenged practice,
just as the measurement of market power would be distorted by focus-
ing only on subset of consumers with inelastic demand.82
Importantly, this holds true both with respect to the all-things-con-
sidered evaluation of competitive effects required of a court answering
the ultimate liability question and with respect to the prior question
of whether a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of anticompeti-
tive effects. A mere increase in price to an arbitrary subset of custom-
ers is not enough to show, even prima facie, that challenged conduct is
harmful overall. This is not just a sound rule: it is indispensable to
avoid absurd overbreadth.
The question, then, is: what conduct and which entities are to be
included in the assessment of competitive effects in a Section 1 rule of
reason case? Our tentative answer is the following: those affected by
the challenged conduct or by conduct in which the defendant has the
ability and incentive to engage as a result of the challenged conduct.
In the context of a two-sided platform, when the challenged practice
on one side causes the defendant to have the ability and incentive to
engage in certain conduct on the other side, the integrity principle re-
quires that the appraisal of competitive effects must include the con-
duct on both sides. If no such link is established, only the conduct on
one side matters. The burden of proving such a link falls wherever it
normally falls as part of the effects analysis: in the first stage of the
rule of reason, the plaintiff must prove on the balance of probabilities
that there is an overall anticompetitive effect across the set of relevant
activities and entities; in the second stage, the defendant must prove
offsetting benefits; in the third stage, the plaintiff must show that the
asserted benefits are too small or too far removed from the anticompe-
titive restraint to justify the competitive harm.
82. See, e.g., Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley Jr., Competitive Price Discrimi-
nation as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70
ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 630–31 (2003) (“[I]t is unlikely the courts meant to suggest
that market power existed when a small firm happened to face a downward-slop-
ing demand curve because of some unique characteristics of its products and
price above its marginal cost.”).
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We see three reasons to recommend this view. First, by ensuring
that the analysis includes those experiencing economic effects
caused—in both a legal and an economic sense—by the challenged
conduct, regardless of on which “side” of the platform they happen to
be located, it better serves the overall-welfare-measuring function of
the competitive effects appraisal.
Second, the proposition that an assessment of the competitive ef-
fects of a restraint should include the effects of other actions that a
defendant has the ability or incentive to undertake because of the re-
straint is consistent with established antitrust principles. For exam-
ple, under the rule of reason, an otherwise anticompetitive provision
may be justified by reference to procompetitive benefits only if the for-
mer was reasonably necessary to achieve the latter.83 In practice, this
means that a court must assess whether the defendant would have
had the ability and incentive to achieve the latter without the for-
mer—essentially, the test we propose. Likewise, in the appraisal of a
merger or acquisition, courts and agencies consider whether, as a re-
sult of the transaction, the merged firm would have the ability and
incentive to engage in certain conduct (such as foreclosure of competi-
tors). If so, the competitive effects of such conduct are included in the
antitrust assessment of the transaction.84 And, in order for an effi-
ciency benefit to be included on the other side of the ledger, the benefit
must be shown to be “merger-specific”—that is, that the merger
caused the parties to access these efficiencies when otherwise they
would have lacked the ability or incentive to do so.85 The Horizontal
Merger Guidelines also recognize that antitrust enforcement agencies
may in appropriate cases consider, in an assessment of a transaction’s
effects, efficiencies that fall outside the relevant market if such effi-
ciencies are “inextricably linked” to the transaction.86 In all these
83. See, e.g., Suture Express, Inc. v. Owens & Minor Distrib., Inc., 851 F.3d 1029,
1038 (10th Cir. 2017); King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 412 (3d Cir. 2015); Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
683 F.3d 328, 336–37 (7th Cir. 2012).
84. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 206 (D.D.C. 2018)
(discussing ability and incentive to foreclose competitors); United States v.
Northrop Grumman Corp., No. Civ.1:02CV02432, 2003 WL 21659404, at *15
(D.D.C. June 10, 2003) (“Absent the protections afforded by the proposed consent
decree, Northrop would have [the] incentive and ability post-merger to deny its
competitors access to either its prime contractor or payload capabilities.”).
85. See, e.g., FTC v. Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ASA, 341 F. Supp. 3d 27 (D.D.C.
2018).
86. See, e.g., HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 46, at n.14 (“The Agencies
normally assess competition in each relevant market affected by a merger inde-
pendently and normally will challenge the merger if it is likely to be anticompeti-
tive in any relevant market. In some cases, however, the Agencies in their
prosecutorial discretion will consider efficiencies not strictly in the relevant mar-
ket, but so inextricably linked with it that a partial divestiture or other remedy
could not feasibly eliminate the anticompetitive effect in the relevant market
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cases, practices and effects that are causally linked are analyzed
together.
Third, our approach provides an appropriate limiting principle to
the Court’s most controversial move in AmEx: the inclusion of both
sides of the platform in the appraisal of competitive effects. In particu-
lar, it clarifies that the Court’s analytical move was appropriate be-
cause—and only because—the challenged conduct (the antisteering
rules) had the effect of giving American Express the ability and incen-
tive to engage in more favorable treatment of cardholders. The Court
was at pains to note the close and complex causal relationship in that
case between the platform’s conduct on one side of the market and the
platform’s profit-maximizing response on the other: first, when setting
out the factual background of the decision,87 and then again, when
explaining why the analysis of competitive effects should include both
sides of the platform.88 And the Court went on to emphasize that, si-
multaneously with the challenged conduct, American Express ap-
peared to have been engaged in beneficial conduct on the cardholder
side. The Court was clearly suggesting a causal relationship between
the two: “[The plaintiffs] have not carried their burden of proving that
Amex’s antisteering provisions have anticompetitive effects. Amex’s
business model has spurred robust interbrand competition and has in-
creased the quality and quantity of credit-card transactions.”89
We are suggesting that AmEx’s treatment of market definition in
competitive effects analysis in a Section 1 case can be—and should
be—read in a way that puts front and center this basic substantive
question of whether particular practices and effects are causally con-
nected, rather than the formalistic question of whether the defendant
is a platform (or a “transactional” platform). On our reading, the
Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ error in proving anticompetitive
effects (even prima facie) was that, having chosen to stake their entire
case on direct evidence,90 they then failed to make a showing of over-
all anticompetitive effects—including either a reduction of output or
an increase in quality-adjusted prices91—arising from what was really
a unitary “package” of behavior: that is, the challenged antisteering
provisions along with the conduct in which AmEx had the ability or
incentive to engage only as a result of those provisions.
without sacrificing the efficiencies in the other market(s). Inextricably linked effi-
ciencies are most likely to make a difference when they are great and the likely
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market(s) is small so the merger is likely to
benefit customers overall.”).
87. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280–81 (2018).
88. Id. at 2286–87.
89. Id. at 2290 (emphasis added).
90. Id. at 2284–85.
91. Id.
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To be clear: the problem, on our reading, was not that the plaintiff
had to rebut procompetitive benefits at the first stage and failed to do
so. Rather, it was that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie an-
ticompetitive effects case across the set of relevant activities and pur-
chasers. That distinction may seem to be a fine one, but the difficult
nature of the anticompetitive effects/procompetitive benefits threshold
is independent of the question of market definition. The same fine
(and/or blurry) line is presented under Section 1 whenever some chal-
lenged agreement seems to have increased both quality and price.
Notice that, on the reading we offer here, AmEx does not stand for
the proposition that in a Section 1 “platform case,” transactional or
otherwise, a relevant market should always be defined to include both
(or all) sides of the platform. Nor does it stand for the proposition that
platforms, transactional or otherwise, are governed by special anti-
trust rules that do not apply to other business models or other mar-
kets. Rather, AmEx simply teaches that in all markets, platforms or
not, the evaluation of competitive effects follows the causal footprint of
the challenged conduct. In some platform cases, this will mean that
participants and activities on the other side of the platform will be
relevant; in others, they will not. What matters for the appraisal of
competitive effects is simply, in each case, whether the analysis em-
braces not just the challenged conduct but also other conduct in which
the defendant has the ability and incentive to engage as a result of the
challenged conduct.
Others read AmEx differently. Katz and Sallet, for example, argue
that harms on one side of the platform alone should always suffice to
establish a prima facie case. They claim that “users on each side of a
platform are entitled to the benefits of competition . . . .”92 But this
claim seems to commit the cardinal antitrust crime of inferring harm
to competition from the fact of anecdotal injury to specific persons.93
Erik Hovenkamp argues that the AmEx majority “collaps[ed] the
entire rule of reason analysis—and all of its intermediate inquiries—
into the plaintiff’s initial burden,” leading to a “major alteration of the
rule of reason’s burden shifting framework.”94 But a plaintiff can
never discharge its burden under the first step of the rule of reason by
showing merely that nominal prices paid by an arbitrarily defined
subset of affected customers have increased, and remaining silent as
92. Katz & Sallet, supra note 5, at 2173.
93. See, e.g., Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We have
consistently held an individual plaintiff personally aggrieved by an alleged anti-
competitive agreement has not suffered an antitrust injury unless the activity
has a wider impact on the competitive market.”) (citations omitted); see also
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (emphasiz-
ing that antitrust laws aim at the protection of competition, not individual
competitors).
94. Hovenkamp, supra note 5, at 6–7.
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to the rest. AmEx simply establishes what should already have been
obvious: that this conclusion holds just as true in the (somewhat)
novel, multisided, context as it is in the familiar, single-sided, one.
This acknowledges the force in Dennis Carlton’s and Ralph Winter’s
comment that there would be something unwelcome in the existence
of “different legal rules for the same economic conduct depending on
whether the market can be described as one-sided or two-sided,”95
particularly given the difficulties in separating those categories in
practice.96 On our view, the rules are the same regardless of whether
a business self-identifies as (or is labeled) a “platform.”
V. CONCLUSION
Our argument is simple. We offer a reading of AmEx as authority
for two appealing and sensible propositions. The first of these is that
the right way to undertake “market definition” in an antitrust case is
a function of the purpose for which one is defining the market: the
right market in which to measure market power need not be the right
market in which to measure competitive effects, and vice versa, even
in the same case. The second is that a measurement of the competitive
effects of a challenged practice should also include the effects of
whatever other practices the defendant will have the ability and in-
centive to engage in as a result of the challenged practice. This may,
but need not, include practices and effects that manifest on both sides
of a platform business. Neither of these propositions is specific to plat-
form cases (or even to “transactional” platform cases), and neither of
them does any violence to established principles of antitrust law or
economics. To the contrary, each has much to recommend it. We re-
serve a fuller development of what we have called the Plural View—
and a treatment of the difficulties and complexities that it raises—for
another occasion.
95. Dennis W. Carlton & Ralph A. Winter, Vertical Most-Favored-Nation Restraints
and Credit Card No-Surcharge Rules, 61 J.L. & ECON. 215, 242 (2018).
96. Katz & Sallet, supra note 5, at 2148–51 (noting difficulties in distinguishing one-
and two-sided businesses).
